Now that they've found their courage, order them all back to active duty

What to do with the six big shots? If I were President Bush, I’d order every one of them back to active duty. I’d put all six in a room and say, OK what went wrong? The first to speak up would be Gen Zinni – NOT ENOUGH TROOPS!!! I’d then call in Gens Franks, Abizaid, and Casey. I’d ask Gen Franks point blank with everyone in the same room, did you have enough troops? Franks would say yes. The war lasted three weeks and was, by any measure, a success. Case closed.

Then I’d ask Gens Abizaid and Casey, do you have enough troops now? They both would answer yes. More US troops equals more US casualties. More US troops equals less of an Iraqi face on operations. More US troops equals a slower transition to Iraqi control. At that point I’d look Gen Zinni in the eye and say, Gen your argument is with these men not the SecDef.

Then I’d ask the others, now what’s your problem? Rumsfeld’s a bully they’d say in unison – nodding approvingly toward one another. Then I’d march the SecDef in. The six would immediately begin looking for a way out of the room. Don, I’d say, these boys say you’re a bully. Rumsfeld’s response would be along the lines of, these guys lack the courage to speak up, to do their duty and I’m a bully?

What about that boys, I’d ask. Well did we say bully? Ahhh, what we clearly meant was that the SecDef was bullish on America. Yes, yes that’s it bullish on America. Really Mr. Secretary we meant no offense.

Then I’d ask the six incarnates of Jomini what else went wrong? Well never should have disbanded the Iraqi army, they’d opine. What about that Mr. Secretary. Rumsfeld might say, well I’d been advocating that the US train and equip an Iraqi army in exile for years before the war. The congress and the leadership within the Pentagon at the time thought that that was a bad idea. Now in hindsight, they all appear to be for it.

With regard to the Iraqi army as it stood after the fall of Baghdad, Rummy’d continue, there was no army. And we could not be sure that if we tried to reconstitute it we wouldn’t be putting leaders of the current insurgency into positions of authority. Also, these guys argue from a position of perfect hindsight. How do they know that had we reconstituted the Iraqi army that the Shia wouldn’t have gone into open revolt? That Ayatollah Sistani wouldn’t have joined with Sadar and started a real civil war – not phony one the media talk about. They don’t know. All they know for sure is that they don’t like me.

Boys, what about that? Well, they’d stammer, not at all Mr. Secretary we love and respect you. Having come to an agreement, I’d thank them and retire them. They’d leave the White House, hold a press conference and call for the SecDef’s resignation because he wouldn’t listen. But we’ve been there.